Attack in progressA leaked CI key of ‹ci-deploy-bot› is being used to break in: 6 accounts and machines created.Open the case
Access entry created or widened by a deployer identity
Lownot re-checked- Rule
V-012- Account
- prod-acct 123456789012
- Where
- eu-west-1
- First seen
- 2026-08-01
- Last seen
- 2026-09-12 (9 days)
- Verdict
- not rated
- Runbook
R-03in the runbooks
What Firekeeper saw
on generated-workload-27 in eu-west-1 (account 123456789012): first seen 9 days ago and still present on the run that wrote this board; the weak set grew from 3 to 5 between the two runs, and none of the new members is covered by an allowlist entry.
Resources
- iam_role:
‹arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/service-role/generated…(65 chars)›(res-1027) - ec2_instance:
‹i-0000000000000001b›(res-2027) - s3_bucket:
‹logs-archive-27[.]example-org[.]invalid›(res-3027) - iam_policy:
‹arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/generated/workload-2…(70 chars)›(res-4027) - launch_template:
‹arn:aws:ec2:eu-west-1:123456789012:launch-template/lt…(75 chars)›(res-5027)
Evidence
e/UVWXYZabcdef e/bcdefghijkmn e/23456789ABCD t/4b1c9e0a-1234-4abc-8def-0123456789ab
Guidance
What this is. Disabling the key makes the existing log files unreadable now. A deletion that runs its course makes them unreadable permanently, without a single log file being touched.
Why it matters. Every detection in the account, this one included, reads those logs. Turning them off is the first move of someone who does not want to be seen, and it also blinds the investigation that comes after.
How to fix it. Restore the trail or detector to the state the account baseline defines, in the infrastructure code that owns it.
Fix it with an agent
A brief for a coding agent on your own machine: what was measured, how this kind of finding goes wrong, and the rules it works under. It investigates first and proposes a pull request; nothing here changes your estate.
Across the last 30 runs
| From | To | Runs | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-12 | 2026-09-12 | 1 | not re-checked |
| 2026-08-14 | 2026-09-11 | 29 | no board input for that run |
Decisions on this finding
No decision names this finding.
Not a problem?
Signing one of these quiets this finding. Nothing changes until you sign with your passkey, and it ends on its own date unless someone renews it.